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Abstract 
National debates concerning the appropriate role of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in the United Kingdom (UK) recently intensified with the suggestion by the current 
Government that the UK might leave the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
system. It has been argued that a British Bill of Rights, to replace the current system of 
national human rights protection provided by the Human Rights Act 1998, would provide 
better protection than the ECtHR making its role in the national system redundant. Claiming 
that the ECtHR is legitimate and has an impact usually illustrated by the transformative 
power of judgments more than ten years’ old, has not provided a convincing answer to this 
claim. In this article, rather than legitimacy or impact, the value of the ECtHR to the 
objective of protecting human rights through law is assessed. Three different levels of value 
are identified from the relevant literature and then applied to the judgments of the Court 
concerning the UK from 2011-2015 to determine what happens in practice. It is concluded 
that given the UK Government’s objective remains to protect human rights through law, 
whilst some types of value are now more relevant than others, overall the potential value of 




The Value of the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) was one of the founding States of the Council of Europe, ratifying 
the Statute of the Council of Europe in 1949 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) in 1951. However, since accepting the right of individual petition to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1966, its relationship with the Council of Europe, the ECHR 
and, in particular, the ECtHR has, at many times, been far from loving. In a lecture delivered 
in 1983, Professor James Fawcett, President of the European Commission from 1972-1981 
found it necessary to defend the ECtHR which had recently found against the UK on corporal 
punishment in State schools and on the criminalisation of homosexual acts in Northern 
Ireland. He explained the importance of human rights law to a country which had no “useful 
Bill of Rights”, and also argued in favour of the Council of Europe, “an organisation which 
gets far less publicity than it deserves for its contribution to the integration of Europe.”1  
The coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) in 2000, giving further effect to 
the ECHR in national law, means that the UK now has much more effective protection of 
human rights through law than it had in 1983.2 However, the animosity towards the ECtHR, 
particularly when it finds against the UK on controversial political issues such as the blanket 
ban on prisoner voting, has not dimmed and in recent years has only intensified. Nicholas 
Bratza, formerly the UK judge at the ECtHR, has written of the “vitriolic” and “xenophobic” 
fury directed against the ECtHR by the UK press, parliamentarians and members of 
                                                             
1 “Human Rights: Our Country in Europe” The Child & Co Lecture 1983, 10 March 1983. 
2 On the Human Rights Act 1998 see generally M. Amos Human Rights Law (Oxford: Hart, 2014). 
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government over the prisoner voting judgments.3 Capitalising on such sentiments, in the run 
up to the May 2015 General Election, the Conservative Party published its proposals for 
changing human right law.4 In these proposals, it accused the ECtHR of “mission creep” by 
expanding the ECHR into new areas beyond what the framers of the Convention had in 
mind, and also of attempting to overrule “decisions of our democratically elected 
Parliament and overturn the UK courts.”5 In order to remedy these problems, it proposed 
that the judgments of the ECtHR be no longer binding over the UK Supreme Court or 
Parliament and that it become an advisory body only.6 It stated that it would attempt to 
reach agreement on these issues with the Council of Europe and should such an agreement 
not be forthcoming, the UK would withdraw from the ECHR.7  
The Conservative Party won the May 2015 General Election and formed a government with 
a small majority in the lower house of Parliament, the House of Commons. Almost 
immediately the new government pledged that within 100 days it would “scrap” the HRA 
                                                             
3 N. Bratza, “The relationship between UK courts and Strasbourg” [2011] European Human Rights Law Review 
505 at 505-506. 
4 Conservative Party Protecting Human Rights in the UK (London: Conservative Party, 2014) available at 
https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf last visited 23 
February 2015. 
5 Ibid, page 3. 
6 Ibid, page 5. 
7 Ibid, page 8. This threat was not repeated in The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 (London: Conservative 
Party, 2015) page 60, available at https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto last accessed 23 February 2015. 
Only the UK Independence Party promised in its manifesto to remove the UK from the jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR. See UK Independence Party Believe in Britain (London: UK Independence Party, 2015) page 53, 
available at http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015 last visited 23 February 2015. 
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and replace it with a British Bill of Rights which would alter the relationship between the UK 
and the ECtHR. This plan was soon dropped and more than a year later still nothing has 
happened although it has been confirmed that it is not a part of “present plans” for the UK 
to withdraw from the ECHR.8 Whilst the Government’s case against the ECtHR is a limited 
one, generally only relying on judgments affecting prisoners or foreign nationals and 
ignoring the impact of the vast majority of ECHR jurisprudence, its position that a British Bill 
of Rights could offer equivalent or better protection for human rights than the ECHR and 
ECtHR at the same time as reclaiming national sovereignty9 has not been effectively 
rebutted. Some have also argued that there is actually no need for the ECtHR or the HRA as 
English common law would develop to fill the gap should either be removed from the 
national legal system.10 Judgments of the ECtHR utilised by its proponents to illustrate its 
impact and transformative power in the UK are generally more than ten years old11 and 
there is little discussion of its contemporary value. 
                                                             
8 See evidence given by former Lord Chancellor, Michael Gove, to Parliament’s EU Justice Sub-Committee on 
26 January 2016. Available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-
select/eu-justice-subcommittee/news-parliament-2015/gove-hra-repeal-evidence/ last visited 22 March 2016. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See, for example, M. Elliott, “Beyond the European Convention: Human Rights and the Common Law” (2015) 
68 Current Legal Problems 85; and P. Sales, “Rights and Fundamental Rights in English Law” [2016] Cambridge 
Law Journal 86. Such arguments have been dismissed as “optimistic” and “naïve” by many. See, for example, 
B. Dickson, “Repeal the HRA and Rely on the Common Law?” in K. Ziegler, E. Wicks and L. Hodson (Eds.) The UK 
and European Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2015); and R. Clayton, “The Empire Strikes Back” [2015] Public Law 
3. 
11 See, for example, Rights Info “50 Human Rights Cases That Transformed Britain” available at 
http://rightsinfo.org/infographics/fifty-human-rights-cases/ last visited 23 February 2016. The Council of 
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Against this backdrop, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, to determine what “value” 
the ECtHR potentially has for a Contracting State. This is distinct from assessing the Court’s 
impact at the national level or its legitimacy. The second purpose is to apply this value 
framework to a five year period of ECtHR jurisprudence concerning the UK to determine 
what value the Court might currently have for a State such as the UK.12  
The question of value 
In this article the question of value is not approached as a philosophical question concerning 
the utility of protecting human rights through law. The assumption is made that protecting 
human rights through law is an important and worthwhile objective which is also shared by 
Contracting States, including the current UK government. In its October 2014 proposals the 
Conservative Party stated that protecting fundamental human rights through law was a 
“hallmark of democratic society” and “central to the values of the Conservative Party”.13 
Protecting human rights at the international level is also an objective of the current 
Government where its policy is to “stand up for human rights by working with international 
                                                             
Europe Parliamentary Assembly recently published a report on the impact of the ECHR on States Parties. The 
most recent judgment concerning the UK listed was S and Marper v UK, Appl. nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 
Judgment of 16 January 2007. The report is available at http://website-
pace.net/documents/19838/419003/AS-JUR-INF-2016-04-EN.pdf/12d802b0-5f09-463f-8145-b084a095e895 
last visited 7 March 2016. 
12 Judgments from 2011-2015. This period of time has been chosen as national human rights protection, 
provided by the HRA, has now fully bedded down making it possible to assess what additional value is 
provided by the ECtHR. 
13 Conservative Party Protecting Human Rights in the UK (London: Conservative Party, 2014) op. cit. at page 5. 
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bodies and priority countries . . . because a safer, more prosperous world is in the UK’s 
national interest.”14 
What is examined in this article is the value to the objective of protecting human rights 
through law  of having an extra layer of human rights law protection above that provided at 
the national level, in the case of the UK by the HRA (or any future British Bill of Rights). 
Asking what value the ECtHR has in this context is a different question from asking whether 
or not the ECtHR has an “impact” at the national level15 or if the Court is “legitimate”16 and 
the answer can provide a very different way of looking at the same facts. To estimate the 
value of the Court to a Contracting State is to assess its worth, desirability or utility to the 
achievement of a particular objective, here the protection of human rights through law.The 
ECtHR clearly has an impact with effects felt in the UK, and often elsewhere, whenever it 
hands down a judgment. But merely considering impact, without considering the value of 
the impact to the Government’s objective of protecting human rights through law, means 
that any ensuing debate about the judgment is missing this additional evaluative element 
                                                             
14 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Policy Human Rights Internationally available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/human-rights-internationally last visited 21 November 2016. 
15 See further H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (Eds.) A Europe of Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2008) and A. Donald, J. 
Gordon and P. Leach The UK and the European Court of Human Rights (London: EHRC, 2012) available at 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/research/83._european_court_of_huma
n_rights.pdf last visited 21 March 2016. 
16 See further M. Kumm, “The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutional Framework of Analysis” (2004) 
15 European Journal of International Law 907 and R. Bellamy, “The democratic legitimacy of international 
human rights conventions: political constitutionalism and the European Convention on Human Rights” (2014) 
25 EJIL 1019. 
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and is therefore not as rich as it might be. In short, whilst many of the same effects will be 
discussed, the question of value allows an additional and often different perspective to also 
be considered. 
For example, should the Court decide in a particular case that the UK has violated the ECHR, 
this will generate a variety of impacts. The applicant will have a judgment of the Court in his 
or her favour which the UK will be obliged by international law to comply with. The 
judgment may clarify or expand relevant ECHR jurisprudence for all Contracting States. 
National human rights law, which is closely linked to ECHR jurisprudence, may have to 
adjust to accommodate a new development. Affording a remedy to the applicant may 
involve affording a remedy to a number of other similarly placed potential applicants. If the 
subject matter of the judgment is politically contested, the judgment may also give rise to a 
national backlash against the ECtHR and human rights law generally.But if the value of the 
judgment to the Government’s objective of protecting human rights through law, nationally 
and internationally, is considered alongside or as an alternative to simple “impact”, the 
narrative is in some respects different. For example, a judgment against the UK might have 
value, as well as impact, to a state intent upon protecting human rights because it 
demonstrates that gaps in national human rights protection are filled by the ECtHR. If it 
changes and develops ECHR jurisprudence in a particular area for all Contracting States it 
may be valuable to improving international human rights standards. At the national level, it 
could also have value if it prompts reform in an area which has remained resistant to 
national initiatives including those sponsored by the Government. 
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The question of the value of the ECtHR must also be distinguished from the question of its 
legitimacy which has generated a significant amount of scholarship in recent years.17 It has 
been suggested that a judgment of a court such as the ECtHR is more likely to be considered 
legitimate if those affected have had a say in it, either directly or via their elected 
representatives; it reflects shared beliefs; or it has been made by an expert and 
authoritative person or institution.18 The value of a judgment to the objective of protecting 
human rights is very different. For example, a judgment of the Court in favour of a State and 
in agreement with that State’s national legislature and the highest national court, is likely to 
be perceived by many as legitimate for all of the above reasons. It might even be argued 
that the judgment actually no impact in such circumstances. Considering the judgment from 
the perspective of value provides a more detailed picture. The individual applicant has had 
the opportunity to have his or her claim determined by a court which is independent of 
national political pressures. Whilst the judgment may have provided no advancement in 
human rights law at the national level, it may have implications for the future acts of other 
Contracting States, particularly if the margin of appreciation was engaged. And confirmation 
from an international court that national law is in accordance with the ECHR has a special 
unique value in itself. 
                                                             
17 See, for example, R. Bellamy, EJIL op cit; K. Dzehtsiarou European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the 
European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2015); A. Zysset, “Searching for the legitimacy of the 
European Court of Human Rights: the neglected role of ‘democratic society’” (2016) 5 Global Constitutionalism 
16; B. Oomen, “A serious case of Strasbourg-bashing? An evaluation of the debates on the legitimacy of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Netherlands” (2016) 20 International Journal of Human Rights 407. 
18 M. Amos, “The Dialogue Between United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human Rights” (2012) 
61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 557 at 575-576  
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But despite the importance of the question, estimating value where there is no obvious 
monetary value is notoriously difficult. Williams has observed that when it comes to the 
ECtHR, we lack a “clear cost-benefit analysis”19 and, as Hathaway states, the claim that 
international law matters was until recently, “so widely accepted among international 
lawyers that there have been relatively few efforts to examine its accuracy”.20 It is not the 
purpose of this article to develop a cost-benefit analysis, or to test the accuracy of the claim 
that international law really does matter. Instead,  existing scholarship concerning the actual 
and potential value of international law, in particular international human rights law, is 
utilised to assemble a value framework. Whilst all of the different types of value 
international human rights law and courts might have are rarely considered together, many 
authors have tested one or two types of value in their research and from this, three broad 
categories of value can be identified. In the following  paragraphs these are separated into 
levels. First, there is value identified at the individual level where the ECtHR has an impact 
on the individual. Second, there is value at the global level where the ECtHR operates as a 
setter of minimum standards or strives to achieve solutions to particular global problems. 
Third, there is a value at the national level where the ECtHR has relevance for national law, 
policy or practice, or the operation of national institutions.  
 
                                                             
19 A. Williams, “The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU and the UK: confronting a heresy” (2013) 
24 EJIL 1157 at 1174. See also D. Cassel, “Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?” (2001) 2 
Chicago Journal of International Law 121 at 131 and K. Alter The New Terrain of International Law (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2014) at 341, 343 and 363. 
20 O. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935 at 1938. 
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The value of the European Court of Human Rights 
Value at the individual level 
The individual justice model utilised by the ECtHR enables victims, once domestic remedies 
have been exhausted, to bring their application to the ECtHR to argue that their State has 
breached their Convention rights. Victims are able to determine for themselves whether or 
not they want to complain “with no State or third party to do so on their behalf.”21  Leach 
observes, it is important not to forget this individual human aspect: 
We owe it to the victims of State violence, and of domestic violence, to the victims of 
human trafficking and those subjected to extraordinary rendition, to people 
languishing in inhuman prisons, and many others, to ensure that we maintain a 
strong and independent human rights court for the whole of Europe.22 
Furthermore, it is likely that feelings of justice, and acceptance of the national decision are 
enhanced where an application is made to the ECtHR, regardless of the outcome.  
Secondly, the ECtHR grants to the disenfranchised and those marginalised and possibly even 
excluded from mainstream society an opportunity to have their human rights claim 
considered by a specialist court, independent of national political pressures at minimal cost, 
albeit with considerable delay.  Buchanan and Powell observe that it is entirely possible for 
                                                             
21 S. Greer and L. Wildhaber, “Revisiting the debate about ‘constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human 
Rights” (2013) 12 Human Rights Law Review 655 at 666. 
22 P. Leach, “What is Justice? Reflections of a practitioner at the European Court of Human Rights” [2013] 
EHRLR 392 at 400. See also S. Greer and L. Wildhaber, ibid, at 678 and D. Cassel, op cit, at 122. 
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well-functioning constitutional democracies to fail to provide “equal protection of the 
human rights of some of their citizens”.23  
Value at the global level 
Many have written of the history of the ECtHR and how it was established to solve pressing 
global problems, in essence, to prevent a recurrence of the atrocities occurring in the 
Second World War and as a “safeguard against tyranny and oppression”.24 According to Von 
Bogdandy and Venzke, in more recent times, international courts are still geared towards 
helping to solve some of the “most pressing global problems” including the maintenance of 
peace. To this end, they are able to overcome problems in cooperation and “mend failures 
of collective action”.25 Hathaway observes that systems such as that provided by the ECHR 
have positive benefits for all States: 
 . . . human rights treaties and the process that surrounds their creation and 
maintenance may have a widespread effect on the practices of all nations by 
changing the discourse about and expectations regarding those rights . . All 
countries, having received the message transmitted by the creation and widespread 
                                                             
23 A. Buchanan and R. Powell, “Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law: Are They 
Compatible?” (2008) 16 The Journal of Political Philosophy 326 at 330. See also C. O’Cinneide, “Human rights 
law in the UK – is there a need for fundamental reform” [2012] EHRLR 595 at 595; S. Dothan, “In defence of 
expansive interpretation in the European Court of Human Rights” (2014) 3 Cambridge Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 508 at 509; and R. Bellamy EJIL op cit at 1039. 
24 E. Bates, “British sovereignty and the European Court of Human Rights” [2012] 128 Law Quarterly Review 
382 at 385.  
25 von Bogdandy and Venzke, “In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and 
Its Democratic Justification” (2012) 23 EJIL 7 at 8. 
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adoption of a treaty, are arguably more likely to improve their practices or at least 
less likely to worsen them then they would otherwise have been.26 
In addition to helping to solve global problems, the ECtHR also can highlight problems which 
have arisen in a Contracting State which could escalate into conflict, either internal or 
external, which may have repercussions for the people of that State and possibly other 
Contracting States. Helfer and Slaughter conclude that States committed to the rule of law 
at the national level are more law abiding at the international level. Conversely, States 
wavering on their commitment to the rule of law at the national level are likely to display 
difficulties with the rule of law at the international level indicating to other Contracting 
States that something is going wrong: 
 . . . states committed to the rule of law domestically will be more law-abiding in the 
international realm, through the projection or transferal of their domestic habits. 
Accustomed to self-imposed constitutional constraints at home, constraints 
enforced by an independent judiciary, they are more likely to accept the constraints 
of international law as enforced by an international or supranational tribunal.27 
                                                             
26 Hathaway, op cit, Yale LJ, at 2021. See, for example the impact in Israel as noted by S. Borelli, “Domestic 
investigation and prosecution of atrocities committed during military operations: the impact of judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights” (2013) 46 Israel Law Review 369. 
27 L. Helfer and A. Slaughter, “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication” (1997-1998) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 273 at 332. 
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The ECtHR also helps to set minimum standards across the 47 Contracting States of the 
Council of Europe as well as, indirectly, the 28 EU Member States.28 Gerards states it is really 
only an institution such as the ECtHR which is be able to “uniformly establish the meaning of 
fundamental rights and to define a minimum level of fundamental rights protection that 
must be guaranteed in all the States of the Council of Europe”.29 For example, at the global 
level, the UK has a much better chance of dealing with like-minded States and has an 
external and neutral reference point, the ECHR as enforced by the ECtHR, which can be 
appealed to rather than national guarantees or national perspectives which are vulnerable 
to the accusation of cultural bias.30 
Finally, at the global level the ECtHR has played a role in scrutinising the actions of other 
international organisations such as the institutions of the European Union, the United 
Nations and the International Criminal Court. This is an important function of the ECtHR 
which might not otherwise occur.31 Its work is also an inspiration to other global and 
regional human rights institutions, for example, Dickson predicts that despite the EU Charter 
                                                             
28 S. Andreadakis, “The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU and the UK: confronting a heresy: a 
reply to Andrew Williams” (2013) 24 EJIL 1187 at 1189. 
29 Gerards, op cit, ECL Review, at 184-186. See also K. Dzehtsiarou and V. Lukashevich, “Informed decision-
making: the comparative endeavours of the Strasbourg court” (2012) 30 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 272 at 273-274. 
30 R. Bellamy, op cit, EJIL at 1032. 
31 See further, S. Andreadakis, op cit, EJIL, at 1189 and C. Ryngaert, “Oscillating between embracing and 
avoiding Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights on Member State responsibility for acts of 
international organisations and the case of the EU” (2014) 39 European Law Review 176 at 190. 
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being a more modern human rights instrument than the ECHR, the Court of Justice of the EU 
will eventually take its lead from the ECtHR.32 
Value at the national level 
Most scholarship is directed at examining the value of the ECtHR at the national level. Such 
is the volume of the literature, that it is helpful to break it down into two overarching types 
of value. First, are the values which can be grouped together as “static” where the ECtHR 
essentially operates as a safety net against national acts in violation of the ECHR. Here the 
claim is that its mere existence is a disincentive for national institutions, particularly 
governments, to act incompatibly with the ECHR. Where such incompatible acts occur, the 
ECtHR can hold the national institutions to account and prompt a reversal or modification to 
ensure compatibility. Second are the values which can be grouped together as “dynamic” 
where it is claimed that a judgment of the ECtHR prompts the improvement of existing laws, 
policies or practices to ensure compliance with the ECHR or might even prompt entirely new 
laws, policies or practices.  
These two types of value come to fruition in the same ways either through a direct impact 
on the Contracting State’s institutions via international law including the obligation imposed 
by Article 46 of the ECHR to abide by the judgment of the ECtHR in cases to which they are 
parties; or via an indirect impact through empowering national courts. Both types of value 
are explained in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
                                                             
32 B. Dickson, “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights” 
[2015] EHRLR 27 at 40. 
15 
 
Static value at the national level 
In the scholarship it is asserted that the ECtHR plays a role in relation to three “static 
values”, essentially acts which preserve the status quo in a Contracting State. First, the 
existence of the ECtHR and its jurisprudence can act as a strong disincentive where States 
are contemplating a possible breach of ECHR rights.33 The disincentive can arise as a result 
of successful litigation before the Court against that State, or a judgment concerning 
another State can indicate that a similar course of action will result in a finding of violation. 
No State is above the temptation to violate ECHR rights as Buchanan and Powell note: 
. . in cases of perceived dire national emergency, such as war and terrorist attacks, 
every constitutional democracy is at risk for unjustifiably infringing civil rights 
generally, not just those of minorities.34 
Second, the ECtHR can hold a State accountable for its acts incompatible with Convention 
rights, even if this does not prompt more widespread change at the national level. Williams 
observes that the Court operates as “check on the outrages of government which are not or 
cannot be challenged by the domestic courts.”35 It is independent from political authorities 
and “political modes of dispute resolution” and has demonstrated that it is willing to 
“decide against governments in big cases”.36 Myjer states that the independence of the 
ECtHR from national institutions is key, it does not “look at the case with the eyes of a 
                                                             
33 K. Alter, op cit, at 23. 
34 Buchanan and Powell, The Journal of Political Philosophy, op cit, at 330. 
35 A. Williams, op cit, EJIL, at 1184. 
36 Helfer and Slaughter, op cit, Yale LJ, at 313. 
16 
 
national judge who is a product of national traditions”.37 It does not face the “kind of 
political and legal pressure that domestic judges do.”38 Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 
observe that Contracting States “eventually adopt some measures, even if token and 
minimal, in response to most of the ECtHR’s adverse judgments against them.”39  
Finally, Alter concludes that a judgment of the ECtHR can help a government maintain the 
status quo in the face of pressure for change. International courts, can “co-opt 
governments, providing legal rulings that governments can use to deflect blame and 
overrule the arguments of domestic opponents.”40 Enduring debates can be put to rest with 
the Court introducing a “finality to disagreements about what the law means”.41 
Dynamic value at the national level 
“Dynamic value” is different to static value in that a judgment of the ECtHR can facilitate a 
process of change and progress. It has been argued that States may be prompted by a 
judgment to improve existing laws, policies and procedures in order to comply with the 
ECHR. Or the jurisprudence of the Court might encourage the adoption of entirely new laws, 
policies and procedures. As above, such values can be realised as a result of a judgment 
against that particular Contracting State, or another Contracting State. The potential of 
                                                             
37 E. Myjer, “The Success Story of the European Court: The Times They are a –changin” (2012) 30 NQHR 264 
38 B. Cali, “The purposes of the European Human Rights System: one or many?” [2008] EHRLR 299. See also K. 
Alter, op cit, at 9. 
39 D. Anagnostou and A. Mungiu-Pippidi, “Domestic implementation of human rights judgments in Europe: 
legal infrastructure and government effectiveness matter” (2014) 25 EJIL at 205 at 206. 
40 K. Alter, op cit, at 21. 
41 K. Alter, op cit, at 29. 
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international courts as agents of change is the key finding of Alter in her book The New 
Terrain of International Law.42 
ICs [international courts] are new political actors on the domestic and international 
stage. Their international nature allows ICs to circumvent domestic legal and political 
barriers and to create legal change across borders. Their legal nature allows ICs to 
provoke political change through legal reinterpretation and to tap into diffuse 
support for the rule of law and pressure governments. Their legal and international 
nature allows litigants to harness multilateral resources and to knit together broader 
constituencies of support.43 
Similarly, von Bogdandy and Venzke note that the judgments of an international court can 
achieve outcomes in the collective interest that the normal political process “has been 
unable to deliver”.44 A judgment of the ECtHR can be an important focus point for NGOs and 
others lobbying for a particular change. Cassel observes that international articulation of 
human rights norms has “reshaped domestic dialogues in law, politics, academia, public 
consciousness, civil society and the press.”45 According to Helfer and Slaughter, where 
individuals of a State are mobilised in support of the judgment of a supranational tribunal, 
“compliance with that judgment becomes less question of ceding sovereignty than of 
                                                             
42 Op cit. 
43 K. Alter, op cit, at 5. Simmons reaches the same conclusion in relation to treaty commitments rather than 
the oversight of an international court. See B. A. Simmons Mobilizing for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) page 8. 
44 EJIL, op cit, at 24. 
45 D. Cassel, Chi J Int L, op cit at 122. 
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responding to constituent pressure” and “sovereignty becomes inextricably interwoven with 
accountability.”46 
It is also claimed that the living instrument approach utilised by the ECtHR ensures that the 
now very dated ECHR, can be applied in new ways to respond to new threats to human 
interests.47 Bratza maintains that the ECtHR keeps track of developments across the 47 
Contacting States so as to ensure its jurisprudence keeps pace with, but does not “leap 
ahead of, societal changes within Europe.”48 States which may lag behind are not given a 
choice but must keep pace with developments forming a “consensus” in the other 47 
Contracting States. It is not only other States that the ECtHR keeps pace with but also 
developments at the international level, taking into consideration the EU and the UN 
perspective for example.49 
The value of the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom 
This summary of the relevant scholarship demonstrates that the work of the ECtHR can be 
of value to a Contracting State at a number of different levels, assuming it is genuinely 
committed to the protection of human rights through law. However, the scholarship also 
indicates that the value of the ECtHR to each Contracting State will be different depending 
on what is happening at the national level at that particular point in time. National law and 
                                                             
46 Helfer and Slaughter, Yale LJ, op cit, at 388. 
47 N. Bratza, “Living instrument or dead letter – the future of the European Convention on Human Rights” 
[2014] EHRLR 116 at 118-119. 
48 N. Bratza, ibid, 124. See also Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich, op cit, NQHR 273-274. 




politics can change and values not at the fore at present might come to have greater 
relevance, particularly if national human rights protection veers away from utilising the 
ECHR and the jurisprudence of the Court as a benchmark. 
The second purpose of this article is to apply the value framework set out above to the 
judgments of the Court concerning the UK from 2011-2015 to test the claims made and to 
determine what specific value the Court now has for the UK. Whilst the various types of 
value identified by scholars may all be reflected in the experience of some Contracting 
States, is it correct to claim that the ECtHR still has value for the UK, a State which continues 
to have relatively strong national human rights protection, an independent judiciary and a 
commitment to democracy and the rule of law? In short, is the present government right to 
argue that the UK no longer needs the Court to continue to protect human rights? 
Value at the individual level 
In 2015, 575 applications against the UK were allocated to a judicial formation, 720 were 
allocated in 2014.50 In 2015, 13 judgments were delivered concerning the UK with four 
judgments finding at least one violation and nine judgments finding no violation.51 And in 
2015, 136 interim measures sought under Rule 39 against the UK were refused.52 Is not 
                                                             
50 European Court of Human Rights Analysis of Statistics 2015 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2016) at page 60. 
Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2015_ENG.pdf last visited 29 February 2016. 
51 European Court of Human Rights Violations by Article and Respondent State 2015 (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, 2016). Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_2015_ENG.pdf last visited 29 
February 2016. 
52 Here the applicants were seeking interim protection under Rule 39 against expulsion from the UK prior to 
the determination of their application by the ECtHR. European Court of Human Rights Interim Measures by 
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therefore true to state that individuals from the UK are no longer interested in applying to 
the ECtHR or that there is complete satisfaction with, or access to, the human rights 
remedies available at the national level. Furthermore, there are still violations found on the 
part of the UK by the ECtHR. 
In addition to the figures, it is important to consider the substance of the applications made. 
Whilst it is often represented that the HRA now affords human rights remedies at the 
national level to all, in relation to some claimants this is not actually the case. Over the last 
five years, a number of successful applications have been brought to the ECtHR by the 
families of those who died during The Troubles in Northern Ireland. These claims are not 
possible under the HRA as it has been held by the House of Lords (now the UK Supreme 
Court) that the HRA only applies in those instances where the death occurred after 2 
October 2000, the date on which the HRA came into force.53 In these applications, the 
ECtHR has always found a violation of Article 2.54 It might also be that a claim is not possible 
under the HRA as it is precluded by a particular interpretation of the HRA or the Convention 
rights which is has not yet been confirmed by the ECtHR. For example, the application in 
Hassan v UK55 was not possible under the HRA as it concerned the alleged ill-treatment of 
an Iraqi civilian by the British armed forces in Iraq. At the time the claim was brought under 
                                                             
Respondent State and Country of Destination 2015 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2016). Available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_art_39_02_ENG.pdf last visited 29 February 2016. 
53 In re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12, [2004] 1 WLR 807.   
54 McDonnell v UK, Appl. no. 19563/11, Judgment of 9 December 2014; Hemsworth v UK Appl. no. 5855/09, 
Judgment of 16 July 2013 and McCaughey v UK, Appl. no. 43098/09, Judgment of 16 July 2013. 
55 Appl. no. 29750/09, Judgment of 16 September 2014. 
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the HRA, it had been held by the House of Lords in its judgment in Al-Skeini56 that the HRA 
had no application to such events as the victim was not within the jurisdiction of the UK.57  
Almost all of the applications brought against the UK in the last five years have been 
brought by members of marginalised groups including: prisoners; disabled people; welfare 
recipients; foreign nationals who have committed a crime facing deportation; failed asylum 
seekers; Iraqi civilians; and those caught up in the criminal justice or family justice systems. 
Despite the ever improving record of the UK, it is important to note that in a number of 
these applications the ECtHR found at least one violation of the ECHR.58  
Value at the global level 
Judgments of the ECtHR concerning the UK over the last five years have contributed to 
various aspects of value at the global level outlined above. For example, in CN v UK59 the 
ECtHR held that the UK was in breach of Article 4 of the ECHR for failing to have in place 
criminal laws penalising forced labour and servitude thereby addressing an important global 
                                                             
56 R. (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26. The ECtHR held that the ECHR did apply to the 
facts in Al-Skeini v UK, Appl. no. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011. This was adopted by the UK Supreme 
Court in its judgment in R. (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence [2013] UKSC 41. 
57 See also Dillon v UK, Appl. no. 32621/11, Judgment of 4 November 2014 and Eweida v UK Appl. nos. 
48420/10, 59842/10 and 36516/10, Judgment of 15 January 2013. 
58 See, for example: Al-Skeini v UK, Appl. no. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011; Betteridge v UK, Appl. no. 
1497/10, Judgment of 29 January 2013; and McDonald v UK, Appl. no. 4241/12, Judgment of 20 May 2014. 
59 Appl. no. 4239/08, Judgment of 13 November 2012. 
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problem and also setting a standard for other Contracting States to meet in this area.60 Its 
numerous judgments concerning deportation and extradition from the UK over this period, 
whilst setting important common standards have also served to expose pressing human 
rights issues in other States.61 The clarification of the circumstances in which the ECHR has 
an extra-territorial effect provided in the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Al-Skeini v UK62 
set the standard for all Contracting States on an important question of law.63 And in a 
judgment in 2014 concerning secondary strike action, the ECtHR reached a different 
conclusion to the European Committee on Social Rights and the ILO Committee of Experts 
noting that these “specialised international monitoring bodies” have a “different standpoint, 
shown in the more general terms used to analyse the ban on secondary action”.64 
However, it is possible that if the UK to withdraw from the ECHR, and thereby the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR, these particular types of global value would continue to accrue, 
and the UK would benefit without making any contribution. The greatest risks would be that 
the UK would find it very difficult to persuade other States to abide by international human 
                                                             
60 See also Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK, Appl. no. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012 where the ECtHR held 
that the admission of torture evidence was manifestly contrary to Article 6 and to the “most basic 
international standards of a fair trial”, at [267]. 
61 See, for example, Aswat v UK, Appl. no. 17299/12, Judgment of 16 April 2013 and H and B v UK, Appl. nos. 
70073/10 and 44539/11, Judgment of 9 April 2013. 
62 Appl. no. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011. 
63 See also Al-Jedda v UK, Appl. no. 27021/08, Judgment of 7 July 2011. 




rights norms were it not to do so itself65 and that the whole ECHR system might collapse, or 
be considerably weakened as a result.66 But rather than guessing at what might happen, an 
alternative approach to the question of global value and the UK is to consider what role the 
UK plays in helping to shape the norms formulated by the ECtHR, in other words, how does 
the UK contribute to the value of the ECtHR at the global level?  
As Amos has observed, over the past five years, the judgments of the ECtHR increasingly 
reflect the growing influence of UK courts. Whilst there are a number of types of influence 
exerted67, when determining the UK contribution to the global value of the ECtHR the most 
important is where UK courts have exerted a strong influence and a particular judgment of a 
UK court makes a significant contribution to the development of Convention jurisprudence 
                                                             
65 C. Hillebrecht, “Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the European 
Court of Human Rights” (2012) 13 Human Rights Review 279 at 295.  
66 Gerards, ECL Review, op cit, at 175-176.  It is possible that the mere suggestion the UK would leave the ECHR 
gave support to similar sentiments in Russia, Poland and Hungary. In December 2015 the Russian Parliament 
adopted a law allowing it to overrule judgments from the ECtHR. It is now possible for the Constitutional Court 
to declare international court orders unenforceable in Russia if these contradict the Constitution 
67 See further, M. Amos “The influence of British courts on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 




which has implications for all Contracting States to the ECHR.68 For example, in Jones v UK69 
the claimants had issued proceedings in the UK against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
servants and agents of the Kingdom, for various torts and torture which had occurred in 
Saudi Arabia. The UK House of Lords had held that the State Immunity Act 1978 conferred 
immunity on all of the respondents and that this was not incompatible with the right of 
access to the courts conferred by Article 6.70 It was for the ECtHR to determine whether or 
not the grant of immunity here was in breach of Article 6, in particular whether the 
immunity was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. This was an important case for 
all Contracting States given the ECtHR was considering whether or not an exception should 
be created to State immunity where civil claims for torture were made against foreign State 
officials.  
The judgment of the House of Lords prevailed and the ECtHR concluded that there was no 
violation of article 6 by affording State immunity to both States and servants and agents of 
the State. The strength of the influence of the judgment of the House of Lords on the ECtHR 
was clear the Court noting that it had “fully engaged with all of the relevant arguments” that 
its judgment was “lengthy and comprehensive” and that its findings were “neither 
                                                             
68 Waters describes this as “norm export”. See further, M. Waters, “Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of 
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law (2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 
487. A UK court can also assert a more moderate influence by identifying an area where a margin of 
appreciation is appropriate. For example, in Animal Defenders International v UK, Appl. no. 48876/08, 
Judgment of 22 April 2013, the ECtHR, clearly influenced by the judgment of the House of Lords, afforded the 
UK a margin of appreciation and found that its political broadcasting ban was compatible with Article 10 ECHR. 
69 Appl. nos 34356/06 and 40528/06, Judgment of 14 January 2014. 
70 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270. 
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manifestly erroneous nor arbitrary”. Furthermore, it was impressed that other national 
courts had examined the conclusions of the House of Lords and found these to be “highly 
persuasive”.71 Were the UK to leave the ECHR system, such glowing references to its highest 
court would no longer be possible and its ability to influence the development of 
Convention jurisprudence for all Contracting States, not only the UK, would be lost. 
Value at the national level 
Reflective of the fact that most scholarship concerns the value of the ECtHR at the national 
level, this is also the level at which the judgments of the ECtHR might have the greatest 
value to the UK. Considering the past five years of judgments, there is evidence that the 
jurisprudence of the Court acts as a disincentive to breach the ECHR, provides remedies to 
victims (without any further change), and also helps the UK government to maintain the 
status quo. However, over the past five years, by comparison to other years, more dynamic 
change as a result of ECHR jurisprudence has not been as frequent. Judgments falling into 
each type of national value are examined in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
A disincentive to act contrary to ECtHR jurisprudence 
Determining what disincentive to act contrary to the ECHR is generated by the judgments, 
or potential for an adverse judgment, from the ECtHR is not an easy task given that there 
                                                             
71 Ibid at [214]. Other examples from 2011-2015 include: Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK, Appl. nos. 26766/05 and 
22228/06, Judgment of 15 December 2011; Austin v UK, Appl. nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, 
Judgment of 15 March 2012; Babar Ahmad v UK, Appl. nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 
67354/09 , Judgment of 10 April 2012; MM v UK, Appl. no. 24029/07, Judgment of 13 November 2012; 
McDonald v UK, Appl. no. 4241/12, Judgment of 20 May 2014 (but only the judgment of Baroness Hale in the 
Supreme Court, R. (McDonald) v Kensington & Chelsea Royal London Borough [2011] UKSC 33.). 
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might be a number of explanations for a course of action on the part of the legislature or 
public authority.72 
In some instances it is possible to discover a clear link. For example, in training, police forces 
throughout the UK are informed of relevant judgments of the ECtHR and these can be found 
throughout the standards of professional practice set by the College of Policing.73 The 
judgment in Austin v UK74 is specifically referred to in guidance concerning policing 
demonstrations.75 Judgments of the ECtHR are on occasion referred to in parliamentary 
debates and by parliamentary committees and the disincentive to take particular courses of 
action is often clearly spelt out.76 A recent illustration is the passage of the Investigatory 
Powers Bill which was introduced to the UK Parliament on 1 March 2016 and has now 
passed all of its parliamentary stages. In short, the Bill concerns the interception of 
communications and the acquisition and retention of communications data. Unusually, the 
                                                             
72 Furthermore, in October 2015 the Ministerial Code was amended to remove the obligation on government 
ministers to “comply with the law including international treaty law and treaty obligations”. Ministerial Code 
(London: Cabinet Office, 2015) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468255/Final_draft_ministe
rial_code_No_AMENDS_14_Oct.pdf last visited 22 March 2016. 
73 http://www.app.college.police.uk/ last visited 15 March 2016. 
74 Appl. no. 39692/09, Judgment of 15 March 2012.  
75 https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/public-order/core-principles-and-
legislation/?s=human+rights last visited 15 March 2016. 
76 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights scrutinises every Government Bill for its compatibility 
with human rights. On the influence of human rights standards in Parliament, see further P. Norton, “A 




Bill was accompanied by an ECHR Memorandum prepared by the sponsoring government 
department.77 The Memorandum contains specific references to relevant judgments of the 
ECtHR particularly the need to address the “foreseeability and compatibility with the rule of 
law requirements of Article 8”78 and it is stated that the Bill is in compliance with the 
minimum safeguards that the ECtHR has held must exist within the legal framework 
governing the interception of communications.79 Whilst there may be reasonable 
disagreement with the Home Office’s assessment that the Bill is fully compliant with the 
ECHR, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on these issues is clearly operating as a disincentive to 
the acquisition of much more sweeping powers for the police and security services.80 
On occasion, the disincentive effect of a specific judgment of the ECtHR is also made clear. A 
high profile example was the application of Abu Qatada whose extradition to Jordan to 
stand trial for terrorist offences had been found compatible with Articles 3 and 6 of the 
ECHR by the UK House of Lords (now the Supreme Court)81. The ECtHR reached a different 
conclusion finding that there was a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice from the admission 
of evidence obtained by torture at his trial and that the proposed extradition was therefore 
                                                             
77 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/506171/ECHR_Memo_-
_Introduction.pdf last visited 17 March 2016. 
78 Page 4. 
79 Page 8. 
80 See also the Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 11 February 2016, HL 
Paper 93 HC 651 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtinvpowers/93/93.pdf last 
visited 17 March 2016 at page 5. 
81 RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10. 
28 
 
incompatible with Article 6.82 Despite the media furore stirred up by the judgment83, it is a 
testament to the disincentive effect of a judgment of the ECtHR that the UK government did 
not extradite until more than 18 months after the judgment once an agreement had been 
reached with Jordan that his trial would not involve the use of evidence obtained by 
torture.84 
A remedy for the applicant but no wider change 
Given the individual application model utilised in the ECHR system, it is possible that an 
application may result in a remedy for the applicant but the specificity of the complaint 
means that there is no need for more widespread change. For example, where applicants 
have successfully established an unreasonable delay attributable to the State in violation of 
Article 6 this can often result in a remedy for the applicant but not an overhaul of the 
system which gave rise to the delay.85 Given that the assessment of a real risk of Article 3 ill 
treatment in a destination State where an applicant is to be removed from the UK is often 
very fact specific, over the last five years there are examples in the immigration and 
extradition context where the ECtHR has reached a different conclusion to the UK courts, 
and afforded a remedy to the applicant, but this has not prompted any further change.86  
By contrast, in some instances more widespread change really is necessary to comply with 
the judgment, but does not happen although the ECtHR can still make the State 
                                                             
82 Othman v UK, Appl. no. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012. 
83 See further, J. Middleton, “Taking rights seriously in expulsion cases: a case study” [2013] EHRLR 520. 
84 He was acquitted of the offences in June 2014.  
85 Piper v UK, Appl. no.44547/10, Judgment of 21 April 2015. 
86 Aswat v UK, Appl. no.17299/12, Judgment of 16 April 2013. 
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accountable, and provide a remedy to the applicant. The numerous successful applications 
brought by families seeking effective Article 2 compliant investigations into deaths which 
occurred during The Troubles in Northern Ireland have forced the Government to be 
accountable for its breaches of the ECHR, but these judgments have not, to date, prompted 
a change in law, policy or practice.87 
Helping to maintain the status quo 
In recent years, in the majority of its judgments concerning the UK, in addition to affording 
remedies to individual applicants with no widespread impact, the ECtHR has helped to 
maintain the UK status quo. There are a number of examples but three in particular help to 
illustrate this particular value. First, the judgment in Austin v UK88 which concerned police 
“kettling” or lengthy containment of demonstrators. It was argued that this was 
incompatible with Article 5 of the ECHR, but the House of Lords had concluded that Article 5 
had no application to the facts.89 The ECtHR agreed noting that police forces in the 
Contracting States face new challenges and Article 5 “cannot be interpreted in such a way as 
to make it impracticable for the police to fulfil their duties of maintaining order and 
                                                             
87 See, for example, McDonnell v UK, Appl. no. 19563/11, Judgment of 9 December 2014 (death in 1996, 
investigation concluded in 2013); Hemsworth v UK, Appl. no. 58559/09, Judgment of 16 July 2013; McCaughey 
v UK, Appl. no. 43098/09, Judgment of 16 July 2013. In January 2016 the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland reported to Parliament that the Government remained committed to establishing the Independent 
Commission on Information Retrieval but no agreement had yet been reached. HC Deb, 21 January 2016, Vol. 
604, Col. 44. Similar problems affect the establishment of the proposed Historical Investigations Unit. 
88 Appl. no. 3962/09, Judgment of 15 March 2012. 
89 Austin v Commissioner of Police [2009] UKHL 5. 
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protecting the public”.90 It concluded that the policing tactic adopted here was not a 
deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5.91 Within limits, police kettling of 
demonstrators, now commonly employed to police large demonstrations, was essentially 
given the green light leading some commentators to ask why the protections of Article 5 
had been undermined.92 
The second example is Animal Defenders International v UK93. Here the applicant 
complained to the ECtHR about the prohibition on paid political advertising imposed by 
section 321(2) of the Communications Act 2003. Its claim under Article 10 had been heard 
by both the High Court and the House of Lords and both had refused to find a violation.94 
When the application to the ECtHR was made, many commentators assumed, based on its 
preceding jurisprudence, that it would find a breach of Article 10.95 At the outset, the Grand 
Chamber held that the margin of appreciation was narrow given that the NGO was 
attempting to draw attention to matters of public interest and “exercising a public 
                                                             
90 At [56]. 
91 “so long as they are rendered unavoidable as a result of circumstances beyond the control of the authorities 
and are necessary to avert a real risk of serious injury or damage, and are kept to the minimum required for 
that purpose”, at [59]. 
92 See N. Oreb, “Case Comment: The Legality of ‘Kettling’ after Austin” (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 735 
93 Appl. no. 48876/08, Judgment of 22 April 2013. 
94 R. (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15. 
95 See further: S. Sackman, “Debating ‘democracy’ and the ban on political advertising” [2009] 72 MLR 475; T, 
Lewis and P. Cumper, “Balancing freedom of political expression against equality of opportunity: the courts 
and the UK’s broadcasting ban on political advertising” [2009] Public Law 89; and T. Lewis, “Animal Defenders 
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watchdog role of similar importance to that of the press”.96 It noted that in determining the 
proportionality of the interference, the “quality of the parliamentary and judicial review of 
the necessity of the measure” was of particular importance97 as the legislative and judicial 
authorities were “best placed to assess the particular difficulties in safeguarding the 
democratic order in their State”98. It then carefully considered all the reviews of the 
prohibition which had taken place at the national level including that of the Parliament, the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Electoral Commission.99 Added to 
this were the judgments of the High Court and House of Lords.100 It concluded that the 
broadcasting ban was not in violation of Article 10. Again, various UK commentators were 
dismayed leading some to ask whether or not the ECtHR had simply lost its nerve and was 
not willing to find against the UK on this question.101 
The third example, already discussed in the context of UK courts making a contribution to 
the development of Convention jurisprudence for all Contracting States, is Jones v UK.102 As 
noted above, this was an important judgment for all Contracting States given the ECtHR was 
considering whether or not an exception should be created to state immunity where civil 
claims for torture were made against foreign State officials. The judgment of the House of 
Lords prevailed and the ECtHR concluded that there was no violation of Article 6 by 
                                                             
96 [103]-[105]. 




101 See T. Lewis, MLR op cit. 
102 Appl. nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, Judgment of 14 January 2014. 
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affording state immunity to both States and servants and agents of the State.103 Some 
commentators described the judgment as a “missed opportunity”.104 
Improvements to existing laws, policies and practices 
By contrast to static value, in recent years the dynamic value of judgments of the ECtHR to 
the UK has been minimal. A very small percentage of the judgments of the last five years 
have required improvements to law, policy or practice. One example is Eweida v UK105 which 
concerned the protection of manifestations of religious belief in the workplace. Here, in 
order to raise the minimum standard of protection under Article 9, the Court had to revisit 
its own case law which had demonstrated a reluctance to find an interference with Article 9 
rights in this context. It concluded that where an individual complains of a restriction on 
freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of changing job 
would negate any interference with the right, the better approach would be to “weigh that 
possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction was 
proportionate.”106 
                                                             
103 Other recent examples of judgments maintaining the status quo in the UK include: Sher v UK Appl. no. 
5201/11, Judgment of 20 October 2015 (anti-terror law); Fazia Ali v UK, Appl. no. 40378/10, Judgment of 20 
October 2015 (allocation of public housing); NJDB v UK, Appl. no. 76760/12, Judgment of 27 October 2015 
(refusal of legal aid); Abdulla Ali v UK, Appl. no. 30971/12, Judgment of 30 June 2015 (adverse publicity fair 
trial); Magee v UK, Appl. no. 26289/12, Judgment of 12 May 2015 (detention without charge); O’Donnell v UK, 
Appl. no. 16667/10, Judgment of 7 April 2015 (right to silence); and Hutchinson v UK, Appl. no. 57592/08, 
Judgment of 3 February 2015 (review whole life tariff).  
104 G. Bindman, “A missed opportunity” (2014) 164 New Law Journal 9. 
105 Appl. nos. 48420/10, 59842/10 and 36516/10, Judgment of 15 January 2013. 
106 At [83]. 
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Another example is the judgment in McDonald v UK.107 Here the applicant claimed that the 
decision of the local authority to reduce her care package and no longer fund a night-time 
carer, resulting in her wearing incontinence pads at night, was in breach of Article 8. The UK 
Supreme Court had concluded by majority that Article 8 was not even engaged.108 The 
ECtHR, agreeing with the dissenting national judge Baroness Hale, reached the opposite 
conclusion finding that the decision was capable of impacting upon the applicant’s dignity 
and therefore her private life as protected by Article 8.109 Although concluding that the 
decision was proportionate, balancing personal interests “against the more general interest 
of the competent public authority in carrying out its social responsibility of provision of care 
to the community at large”110, the fact that the decision was found to be within the scope of 
Article 8 was an important development meaning that public authorities making this type of 
decision would have to carry out a proportionality assessment.111 
There are also those areas where there might have been some motivation generated to 
comply with ECtHR jurisprudence, but the change is so wide-ranging that it is difficult to 
attribute solely to the ECtHR. An example is the changes which have taken place to the 
                                                             
107 Appl. no. 4241/12, Judgment of 20 May 2014. 
108 R. (McDonald) v Kensington & Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2011] UKSC 33. 
109 At [47]. 
110 At [57]. 
111 A small change to statute providing protection against unfair dismissal resulted from the judgment in 
Redfearn v UK, Appl. no. 47335/06, Judgment of 6 November 2012 (s.13 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
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probation service.112 In a number of judgments the ECtHR has found violations of Article 
5(4) in that prisoners have been detained in prison past the expiration of the tariff period 
because of a lack of manpower and resources for the Probation Board. For example, in 
Betteridge v UK113 the ECtHR found that the delay in release which occurred was the direct 
result of the “failure of the authorities to anticipate the demands which would be placed on 
the prison system” as a result of a new type of sentence.114 Similar conclusions, regarding 
the impact of “inadequate resources” had been reached in 2012.115 
New laws, policies and practices 
More fundamental changes to laws, policies or practices, or new initiatives as a result of a 
judgment of the ECtHR concerning the UK over the past five years have been rare. The most 
dramatic change has not been to statute law but to the application of the HRA extra-
territorially as a result of UK courts adopting the conclusion of the ECtHR in Al-Skeini v UK.116 
The ECtHR concluded that exceptions to territorial jurisdiction were state agent authority 
and control and effective control of an area, anywhere in the world. In the present 
application it concluded that the United Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security 
operations in Basra during the period in question, “exercised authority and control over 
                                                             
112 See further, N. Padfield, “The magnitude of the offender rehabilitation and ‘through the gate’ resettlement 
revolution” [2016] Criminal Law Review 99. 
113 Appl. no. 1497/10, Judgment of 29 January 2013. 
114 At [40]. 
115 James, Wells and Lee v UK, Appl. no. 25119/09, Judgment of 18 September 2012. 
116 Appl. no. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011. Adopted by the Supreme Court in Smith v Ministry of Defence 
[2013] UKSC 41. 
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individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional 
link.”117 As a result, the Court concluded that there was a procedural obligation under 
Article 2 to investigate the deaths of Iraqi civilians.  
The judgment has led to applications raising questions of compliance with Articles 2, 3 and 5 
under the HRA in UK courts brought by foreign nationals and members of the UK armed 
forces who have served abroad.118 Many of the investigations are conducted by the Iraq 
Historic Allegations Team which was established in 2010 to “review and investigate 
allegations of abuse by Iraqi civilians by UK armed forces personnel in Iraq during the period 
of 2003 to July 2009.” The scope of its investigations is described as follows: 
The alleged offences range from murder to low-level violence and the time period 
covers the start of the military campaign in Iraq, in March 2003, through the major 
combat operations of April 2003 and the following years spent maintaining security 
as part of the Multi-National Force and mentoring and training Iraqi security 
forces.119 
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situations of international armed conflict “albeit interpreted against the background of the provisions of 
international humanitarian law”. See [104]-[107]. 
118 See, for example, Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41. 
119 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/iraq-historic-allegations-team-ihat last accessed 14 March 2016. 
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It was reported in The Guardian on 22 January 2016 that the government has paid £20 
million in settlement of 326 claims to date.120 It was stated in Parliament in January 2016 
that IHAT’s case load now involves just over 1,500 alleged victims, 1,235 of whom are 
victims of ill treatment and 280 of unlawful killing.121 
So what added value does the ECtHR have for the UK? 
At the outset of this article it was explained that a present day value based assessment of 
the role of the ECtHR would enrich the debate concerning whether or not the  UK still 
needed the Court  to help to provide protection for human rights through law at the 
national level. Having utilised relevant scholarship to establish  a value framework, with 
various potential values of the Court identified at the individual, global and national levels, 
this has been applied to  five years of jurisprudence concerning the UK to test the accuracy 
of the claims made. It is now important to consider what value the Court currently has for a 
State such as the UK.At present, the ECtHR clearly has a value to the UK at the individual 
level. Applications continue to be lodged and declared admissible, and violations are still 
found. The ECtHR has a gap filling function ensuring justice is available to those unable to 
access this through national human rights law, and providing a legal route, less influenced 
by national political considerations, for those at the margins of UK society. But, as already 
noted, value at the global level is a more difficult question. The UK is a key player in the 
ongoing value of the Court at this level and obviously benefits enormously from human 
rights protection being maintained throughout the 47 Contracting States as well as globally. 
                                                             
120 http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jan/22/david-cameron-wrong-to-deter-legal-claims-against-
iraq-veterans last visited 14 March 2016. 
121 Richard Benyon MP, 27 January 2016, HC Debates Vol 605, Col 190. 
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However, responding to the argument that the global value of the ECtHR will continue to be 
realised without the UK’s input is more difficult. It has been suggested that an alternative 
way to consider this value is how the UK now clearly has a role in shaping the global norms 
formulated by the ECtHR. Should it exit the ECHR system of protection, the UK may find 
itself complying with a variety of human rights standards insisted upon by other States 
which it has had absolutely no role in formulating. 
The greatest value of the ECtHR to the UK continues to be at the national level. But with the 
enhanced national human rights protection through law provided by the HRA, judgments 
with a dynamic value similar to Smith122 (blanket ban on homosexual service personnel), 
Osman123 (positive duty on police to protect), and Campbell and Cosans124 (corporal 
punishment in schools) are now the exception rather than the norm. But rather than looking 
to the ECtHR predominantly as a force for societal change, it is important to also appreciate 
its static value. It continues to act as a strong disincentive where there is a temptation to 
breach the ECHR as recent experience with the Investigatory Powers Bill illustrates. It 
provides justice and a remedy to a victim of a breach of human rights law which, for one 
reason or another, cannot be rectified at the national level. Most importantly for a 
government openly hostile to “European” intervention in national affairs, it helps to 
maintain the status quo by confirming the national courts’ interpretation and application of 
human rights norms to often controversial issues. As noted above, this can grant a finality to 
national debates which have been ongoing for many years, such as that over political 
                                                             
122 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, Judgment of 27 September 1999. 
123 Osman v United Kingdom, Appl. No. 23452/94, Judgment of 28 October 1998. 
124 Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 7511/76 and 7743/76, Judgment of 25 February 1982. 
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advertising, which no national institution would ever be able to achieve. It also provides a 
strong affirmation that the UK’s overt commitment to protecting human rights through law 
is working, despite what critics of the judgments of the national courts and the ECtHR might 
think. 
Each of the judgments of the ECtHR concerning the UK will have one or more types of value 
and considering judgments from the perspective of value, alongside questions of impact and 
legitimacy, can provide different insights. For example, the judgment of the ECtHR finding 
the proposed extradition of Abu Qatada to Jordan incompatible with the ECHR125 was 
perceived by many as highly illegitimate given that it was contrary to the conclusion of the 
Supreme Court and the wishes of elected politicians. But it did have a number of impacts: he 
was not extradited until an agreement was concluded with Jordan; the law concerning 
deportation where there was a real risk of a flagrant denial of Article 6 was developed; and 
a further backlash against the ECtHR and human rights law commenced.  
Stopping the analysis of the judgment there reveals only a part of the story – considering 
the value of this judgment, in accordance with the framework set out, provides an 
additional perspective. It could be argued that the judgment had value at the individual level 
as it provided a remedy to an applicant marginalised and demonised with a highly politicised 
claim. It also had value at the global level in that the ECtHR established, for all Contracting 
States, that it is not compatible with Article 6 of the ECHR to admit evidence obtained by 
torture and it is in flagrant denial of this guarantee to deport or extradite where there is a 
real risk this might occur in the destination State. And it had a value at the national level 
demonstrating the strong disincentive effect of a judgment of the ECtHR on a government 
                                                             
125 Othman v UK, Appl. no. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012. 
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under considerable political pressure, holding it to account and ensuring a change in 
national law preventing removal from the UK where a similar risk of a flagrant denial of 
justice was present.  
Conclusion 
For a State ostensibly committed to protecting human rights through law, but questioning 
its membership of the ECHR system and the oversight of the ECtHR, determining the value 
of the Court is an important exercise, alongside questions of impact and legitimacy. 
However, whilst the value of the ECtHR to a Contracting State is not a question which has 
been completely ignored in the literature, it is question which is not often considered in 
detail or applied to the recent experience of a Contracting State. In this article, three 
overarching categories of value have been identified from relevant scholarship: individual, 
global and national. The strength of each will vary depending upon circumstances prevailing 
in the Contracting State at a particular point in time. When this framework is applied to the 
experience of the UK over the past five years before the Court, the results are very different 
from that which would have been revealed ten years ago when the effects of the much 
improved human rights protection provided by the HRA had yet to filter through to the 
applications made to the Court. However, it is not correct to claim that the Court therefore 
no longer has any value for the UK.   
It is likely that debates over the UK’s future relationship with the ECtHR will continue, 
particularly if the current Government presses ahead with its plans for a British Bill of Rights. 
But as has been demonstrated in this article, it is not possible to have a commitment to 
protecting human rights through law and also dismiss the value of the ECtHR in contributing 
to this objective. Where politics, nationalism, or misplaced considerations of national 
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sovereignty are really driving such debates, highlighting the present day value of the ECtHR 
can help to illustrate what will really happen if the UK were to leave the ECHR system and 
the oversight of the Court. In short, those unable to pursue remedies at the national level 
will have no alternative; UK courts will lose their remarkable, and growing influence on the 
jurisprudence of the Court; the disincentive to violate human rights provided by an 
independent external arbiter will fall away; the Court’s potential as a catalyst for dynamic 
change will be lost; and the value of the Court’s regular confirmations that the UK is doing a 
good job with human rights will be squandered.  
